Diversity and profitability : evidence and future research directions / 1433 by Grant, Robert M. & Thomas, Howard

tge library from
wbrchrt
J£,
B
„,
on or before tta
.latest D lmum
re:f$r5.?oCe«s?.s.b..k .fee OT Jf /a.vw w8 reason»
Theft, mut.la.lon,
a£
""J^Ji, ,„ dl.ml.s-1 *o™
for disciplinary
action and may
the University. N£ CENTER, 333-8400
TO RENEW CALL
TELEPHO E
uttAI4A^AMPA10N_
UNl>-ERSJTYOFjWN^^
»w tit3W
W.en renewing by phone,
wnte new due date
below
previous due date.
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/diversityprofita1433gran

ST
pfe*v BEBR
FACULTY WORKING
PAPER NO. 1433
Diversity and Profitability:
Evidence and Future Research Directions
Robert M. Grant
Howard Thomas
College of Commerce and Business Administration
Bureau of Economic and Business Research
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

BEBR
FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 1433
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana- Champaign
February 1988
/
Diversity and Profitability:
Evidence and Future Research Directions
Robert M. Grant,
London Business School
and University of British Columbia
Howard Thomas, Professor
Department of Business Administration
We acknowledge the contribution of Azar Jammine to this paper
and particularly the help provided by the Centre for Business
Strategy, London Business School.

DIVERSITY AND PROFITABILITY:
EVIDENCE AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
ABSTRACT
Empirical research spanning two decades has failed to establish
conclusively how diversification affects corporate performance. This
article sheds new light on the relationship by reporting the findings
of an empirical study of British manufacturing industry. We find
that, in general, multinational diversification is more profitable
than product diversification and that once a high level of product
diversity is reached, increased diversity is associated with lower
levels of profitability. We further argue that the nature of the
relatedness between a company's business activities is a key determi-
nant of the success of diversification: corporate-level relatedness
is much easier to manage than operational relatedness. We conclude
with a discussion of future research directions.

Introduction
Academic research into the relationship between diversification and
firm performance has contributed to a substantial shift in business
opinion concerning the merits of diversification. In the decade
1962-72 a stream of research emanating from Harvard Business School
identified a consistent trend in corporate development in the U.S. and
Western Europe that pointed towards the diversified, divisionalized
corporation as the highest evolutionary form of business enterprise.
These findings, occurring at a time when both large, established corp-
orations and the newly-emerging conglomerate enterprises were
embarking upon ambitious diversification strategies, reinforced the
prevailing view that diversification offered the primary route for
large firms to secure higher, more stable earnings.
However, one of. the Harvard studies sounded a discordant note.
Ricfiferd Rumelt's research confirmed the trend towards diversification
among the Fortune 500
,
but found, first, that diversified firms did
not, in general, outperform more specialized firms and, second, that
firms pursuing unrelated' diversification were less profitable than
firms which diversified into closely related fields. Further study,
both in the U.S. and in other countries produced similar findings,
particularly regarding the superiority of related over unrelated
2diversification. These results have been summarized by Peters and
Waterman as follows:
...virtually every academic study has concluded
that unchannelled diversification is a losing
proposition. . .it seems worthwhile to illustrate
rather exhaustively the almost total absence for
-2-
any rigorous support for very diversified business
combinations (Peters and Waterman 1982, p. 294,
296).
Another management consultant, Milton Lauenstein of Lauenstein and
Associates has summarized the evidence even more succinctly:
...we know that, on the whole, diversified com-
panies have not done so well. (Lauenstein 1984, p.
49)
On the basis of their own observations and their reading of other
people's research, Peters and Waterman have carried one of their
golden rules—"stick to the knitting":
Organizations that do branch out but stick very
close to their knitting outperform the others. The
most successful are those diversified around a
single skill... The least successful, as a general
rule, are those companies which diversify into a
wide variety of fields. Acquisitions especially
among this group tend to wither on the vine.
(Peters and Waterman, 1982, p. 293)
Yet despite the findings of Rumelt and others and the well-
f
publicized failures of diversification initiatives among many leading
companies, the case against broad-spectrum diversification is far
from proven. It has been observed that the highly profitable
"constrained" diversifiers in Rumelt 's sample tended to inhabit high
growth, high profit industries (e.g. pharmaceuticals). There is also
doubt over direction of causation: unrelated diversification may be a
response to low profitability rather than a cause of it. Furthermore,
recent studies are producing evidence of relatively strong profit per-
formance by highly diversified companies
—
particularly among the "new
conglomerates".
The study reported in this paper is an analysis of the rela-
tionship between diversification and profitability based upon a large
-3-
sample of British manufacturing firms. The main findings are first,
that diversification can be measured better using diversification
indices. Second, that there are diminishing returns to diversity
associated with increasing administrative and monitoring costs.
Third, that international diversification is more profitable than
product diversification.
The research
We used a data base containing details of both product and multi-
national diversification for 304 large British manufacturing companies
which had been meticulously compiled by Azar Jammine (1984) for the
years 1968 to 1984.
We started with three principal propositions concerning the rela-
tionship between diversification and profitability.
1) Competitive advantage Diversification builds competitive advan-
t
tage for the firm either when it exploits economies of scope or
where it permits the transfer of a key skill from one business
area to another. If the success of diversification is dependent
upon these conditions then it follows that
(i) diversification into related businesses is more profitable
than diversification into unrelated businesses; and
(ii) multinational diversification is more profitable than product
diversification since it is usually easier to transfer skills
and resources between countries than between industries.
2) Complexity Diversification increases the complexity of corporate
management and causes problems in communication, coordination,
-4-
accountability and control. This implies that there may be a
limit to the degree of diversity that can be effectively managed.
(Rumelt, 1982)
3) Profit-led diversification The usual assumption is that diversi-
fication strategy influences profitability. However, it is also
likely that firms can use their profit earnings to finance diver-
sifying investments. Indeed, in the latter case, managers may be
tempted to use internal funds to build corporate empires or pro-
tect employment rather than to pursue stockholders' objectives.
Measuring diversification
Three measures of diversification were employed:
1. Rumelt's (1976) classification of diversification strategies
which is based upon two criteria: first, the specialization ratio
f of the company (the proportion of sales which the major activity
accounts for) and, second, the relationship between the activi-
ties. Rumelt identifies three types of relationship: vertical
integration (the output of one activity is an input of another),
"constrained" diversification (activities are related to one other
by a common core skill), and "linked" diversification (each busi-
ness activity is related to at least one other but the businesses
are not all related to one another). Rumelt's eight-cell classi-
fication of strategies is shown in Table 1.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
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Firms were thus judgementally allocated to different categories of
corporate strategy depending upon the extent of product-diversity
and the relationships between different businesses.
2
2. Index of product diversification (PD1) This was measured as 1/Xs.
i
where s is the share of a company's total sales in industry
i. This is a very common measure of diversity in industrial organ-
ization research. Hence, a company specialized within a single
industry has a product diversification index (PDI) of 1, a company
with sales equally distributed between 4 industries has PDI of 4.
3. The overseas ratio is an index of multinational diversity. A com-
pany's multinationality was measured by the proportion of its
sales accounted for by overseas subsidiaries.
It should be noted that the chief merit of the product and
'multi-national diversity measures is that they are continuous
quantitative measures which measure differences in diversity
across firms and time. The merit of the Rumelt classification is
that it measures relatedness as well as breadth of diversity.
The findings
Because firm profitability is influenced by a very large number of
factors, it was necessary to use multiple regression analysis to
separate out the influence of diversification from that of industry
variables, firm size and leverage. Summary details of the equations
used are given in Table 2. Our first general finding was that diversi-
fication accounted for only a small proportion of inter-firm dif-
ferences in return on investment (ROI). Differences in diversity
-6-
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
between firms explained between 5 and 9% of total inter-firm variance
in ROI, while industry effects explained around 12%. However,
although diversification did not appear to be a major factor
explaining differences in performance between companies, its rela-
tionship with profitability was both significant and interesting. The
key findings were as follows:
1. The impact of diversification strategies
In contrast with a number of prior studies, we found that the
Rumelt strategic categories were of little value in explaining why
some firms were more profitable than others. Table 3 shows the profit-
ability differences associated with each category relative to the
profitability of the single business strategy.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Over the period as a whole (1972-84) the differences in percentage
ROI between the strategic categories (after excluding the effects of
firm size, industry membership and other variables) were small and all
were statistically insignificant from zero. The only notable finding
was that more diversified categories tended to perform better than the
more specialized categories. Also the relative profitability of the
different categories changed substantially over time, in particular,
the profitability of the Single Business firms declined by an average
of 74% over the period, while the Related Business categories improved
their relative profitability, even after taking account of other variables.
-7-
Our finding that there were no significant performance differences
between related and unrelated diversification strategies contradicts
the findings of several earlier studies. However, this finding does
not necessarily mean that relatedness between businesses is irrelevant
in affecting the success of diversification. It is more likely that
the empirical measure of relatedness incorporated into our classifica-
tion was too narrow to encompass the full range of relationships be-
tween a company's business units. The Rumelt categorization is based
largely upon technological and market linkages but firms may create
competitive advantage through the exploitation of "distinctive
competencies," which may involve other dimensions of relatedness such
as financial synergy. We shall return to the issue of relatedness in
our concluding section.
2. Product diversification and ROI
t
Our dissatisfication with the strategic categories approach was
confirmed by the regression analysis which showed that the simple
Product Diversity Index explained a higher proportion of inter-firm
differences in ROI than did the Rumelt classification. Hence our sub-
sequent analysis of product diversification utilized PDI.
The key finding was that the relationship between product diver-
sity and ROI was quadratic in form. In essence, the costs of managing
a complex diversified firm overwhelm the benefits of diversity beyond
a certain level of diversification. Once the influences of multi-
national diversity, industry membership, firm size and leverage were
taken into account, ROI increased with product diversity up to a PDI
-8-
of 3.7, after which further increases in PDI reduced ROI. Figure 1
graphs the relationship.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Thus at high levels of diversity, the dominant influence on profit-
ability was the increased costs of managerial complexity associated
with very diverse companies. However, the positive association be-
tween diversity and profitability over most of the range of our obser-
vations could not be unambiguously interpreted. The positive
relationship could be due either to efficiency benefits from diversi-
fication through economies of scope or transfer of skills, or from
profitability being used to finance diversification.
To shed light on the issue of causation we examined changes in
product diversity and changes in ROI over the period. By switching
dependent and independent variables and examining which changes
occurred first, the predominant direction of causation could be
established. If diversification was driving profitability, then
change in PDI would be positively associated with future changes in
ROI, with a lag of around five years. If profitability was driving
diversification, then changes in PDI would be positively associated
with the rate of cash flow generation by the company (where cash flow
was defined as past tax earnings plus depreciation).
We found that changes in product diversity had an insignificant
relationship with future changes in ROI. Cash flow, on the other
hand, bore a positive, if weak, association with product diversity.
The implication, therefore, is that our positive relationship between
-9-
prof itability and product diversity was due primarily to retained
earnings being used to finance diversification.
3. Multinational diversification and ROI
In contrast to product diversity, multinationality showed no
quadratic relationship with ROI once product diversity, firm size,
leverage and industry effects were taken into account, the best fit
between overseas ratio and ROI was a simple, straight-line rela-
tionship (see Figure 2).
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
As with product diversity, this relationship was consistent either
with multinational expansion generating increased profitability, or
with retained earnings being used to finance overseas direct invest-
ment^. Hence, we followed the previous procedure in investigating
causation. We found:
(a) changes in the overseas ratio were positively and signifi-
cantly related to future changes in ROI (with a five year
lag)
(b) changes in the overseas ratio were even more strongly related
to future changes in sales:
(c) cash flow was positively and significantly related to changes
in overseas ratio.
Unlike product diversification, therefore, we observe a strong two-
way relationship between multinational expansion and profitability.
The firms in our sample which were responsible for most of the over-
seas expansion over the period displayed the following characteristics
-10-
- they were large
- they were largely UK based at the beginning of the period,
- they were earning above average ROI on their UK operations
At the same time, overseas expansion appeared to be successful in
generating increases in both ROI and sales. The relationships which
we estimated are shown in Figure 3.
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
Implications for the management of diversification
On its own, our study offers little guidance to managers on whether
or how to undertake diversification. The relationships which our study
identifies are for British companies over the period 1972 to 1984. These
relationships cannot be assumed to hold in other countries and in other
time periods. In order to make recommendations for the management of
f
diversification we must fit our findings into the overall framework of
knowledge concerning diversification and firm performance to see what
general relationships, if any, emerge.
The key problem here has already been discussed: no consensus
emerges either among previous or current studies which permits any set
of rules to be drawn up. Thus, many earlier studies found strong evidence
of related diversification outperforming unrelated diversification
—
yet
our study found no significant differences, while other recent studies
have shown unrelated diversification to yield superior returns. Several
studies have shown multinational corporations to perform less well than
domestic corporations , but our results show multinationality to be
-11-
associated with higher profitability and higher growth. However, it is
in seeking explanations of these differences in empirical findings that
enables deeper and more valuable insights to be gained into the true
nature of the relationships between corporate behavior and performance.
On the basis of our own and other researchers' findings we iden-
tify four major lessons for practicing manager:
1) There is no strong evidence of product diversification
leading to superior profitability . While there is a weak
positive relationship between product diversity and profitabil-
ity, up to fairly high levels of diversity, there was no
tendency for diversification to increase the rate of profit-
ability and the primary direction of causation appeared to be
from profitability to diversification. Although other studies
have not specifically addressed the causation issue, there is
broad agreement that diversification does not generally lead
to higher profitability. Why then does diversification take
place? Two explanations are feasible. The first is that
diversification is directed towards reducing risk rather than
increasing return. However, most studies show that, in terms
of returns to stockholders: corporate diversified companies
have neither lower overall risk nor lower systematic risk
than undiversified companies. Our study also supports this
finding. Moreover, modern financial theory suggests that in
efficient securities markets, corporate diversification
yields no benefits to stockholders who are able to diversity
their own portfolio holdings.
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The second is that diversification is promoted largely
by managers promoting their own rather than stockholder
interests. Thus, diversification may offer managers the
benefits of larger corporate size and greater security from
hostile takeovers. Our finding that profit earnings tend to
promote diversification together with the accumulating evi-
dence on the poor returns from mergers to the stockholders of
acquiring firms is suggestive that the underlying motives
for diversification may be top executives' drive for self and
corporate aggrandizement.
2) There are limits to the degree of organizational complexity
that firms can successfully manage . Our study found that
beyond fairly high levels of product diversity, diversity
was negatively associated with profitability.
- the most diverse firms (both product and multinational)
tended to reduce their degree of diversity from the late
1970s onwards.
These findings together with others that report generally poor
performance from highly diversified companies, support the
notion that, for most companies, there is some limit to the
number and range of activities that can comfortably be
managed within a single enterprise. However, it is also true
that both in our UK sample and in some U.S. studies, some of
the most profitable companies have been highly diversified,
conglomerate companies.
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3) Multinational diversification in general offers greater pro-
fit potential than product diversification . Our study finds
that multinational diversification is conducive both to
increased profitability and growth. This confirms a number of
theoretical arguments supporting the competitive advantages
of multinationals. What is interesting, however, is that few
other studies have found similar evidence. Hence the suspi-
cion remains that the relationship between multinational
diversification and increased profitability that we identify
may reflect the particular circumstances of the British eco-
nomy over the period—notably the low ROI earnings in British
manufacturing industry as compared to those in other
countries.
4) On related and unrelated diversification strategies .
Probably the most interesting issues for the management of
diversification concern the differential success of different
diversification strategies. The principal finding of earlier
research was the superior performance of related diversifica-
tion over unrelated diversification. However, our study
found no significant performance differences between related
Q
and unrelated strategies. Other recent studies have found
similar results while two have found unrelated diversifiers
earning higher ROI than related diversifiers. The incon-
sistencies of these findings are not easily explicable. Our
prior hypotheses argued strongly for the advantages of
related diversification in terms of exploiting economies of
-14-
scope and transferring distinctive competencies. However,
these arguments concern the potential benefits from diver-
sification and ignore the organizational and administrative
costs incurred in exploiting these gains. The main finding
arising from organizational studies of diversification is
that the costs of managing related businesses exceed those of
managing unrelated businesses.
To understand why, consider the multidivisional corporation.
The primary benefit of the multidivisional structure in the
management of diversity is that it economizes on coordination
costs by separating operational management from strategic
management. However, the benefits of the multidivisional
structure in permitting differentiation of functions and
management systems between corporate head office and the
operating divisions and in allowing divisional autonomy in
operating policy are severely compromised where there are
important interdependencies between the divisions. Lorsch
and Allen's study of managing diversity and interdependence
in six multidivisional firms found that the problems of coor-
dination encountered in managing diversity depended upon the
degree and the type of interdependence between divisions.
The existence of "operating synergies" necessitated lateral
coordination between divisions, a corporate headquarters that
exercised important functional responsibilities, and modifi-
cations to the autonomous division profit center concept.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
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The implication, therefore, is that in analyzing the poten-
tial for diversification to create competitive advantage we
need to consider different types of relatedness between busi-
nesses. Table 4 proposes three types of relatedness that may
occur between businesses. The main prediction from Table 4
is that, while operational relatedness offers the most
tangible benefits in the form of cost reductions from econo-
mies of scope, these benefits are likely to be offset by the
costs of managing the necessary coordination. On the other
hand, the benefits of skill relatedness and corporate manage-
ment relatedness may be less observable, but pose significant
coordination problems. Thus Lorsch and Allen (1973, p. 168)
report
:
...the conglomerate firms we studied
seemed to be achieving appreciable
degrees of financial and managerial
synergy but little or no operating
synergy; others had met with little
success in trying to achieve it.
The role of corporate management relatedness has been largely
overlooked in the literature. Many of the firms that we (and
others) have classified as "unrelated" show little or no
operating or skill relatedness (e.g. technological,
marketing, etc.) but can be effectively managed because the
operating subsidiaries face similar strategic issues and
respond to similar control, incentive and resource allocation
systems. Thus the diverse activities of Hanson Trust in the
UK are linked by their being high market share, mature
businesses with limited exposure to international competition,
-16-
and are fitted to Hanson's particular type of financially-
based corporate management style.
Other companies have perceived certain synergies arising from
operating and skill relatedness, but have ignored the issue
of whether these areas of relatedness can be effectively har-
nessed by corporate management. A classic example here is
EMI in the UK whose diversification from phonographic records
and consumer electronics into medical electronics offered
elements of technological relatedness but was a total
mismatch in terms of corporate management systems and style.
The ability of management to handle the medical electronics
area was very poor. The consequent disastrous performance
of the medical electronics divisions eventually led to EMI's
demise.
Thus is appears likely that the key aspects of relatedness
that determine success in diversification may be compatible
corporate-level management style and systems, or what
Prahalad and Bettis have termed the "dominant general manage-
ment logic." Or to put it simply, diversifications may
offer certain potential areas of relatedness and synergy.
But they can only be made to work by knowledgeable and effec-
tive management.
Conclusions
The empirical findings presented in this article indicate that
corporate diversification is neither generally successful nor
-17-
generally unsuccessful. The variation in the experiences of indivi-
dual companies is considerable and it is clear from other evidence
(including case studies such as EMI) that the profitability of diver-
sification is crucially dependent upon factors which are specific to
the industries which the firm is spanning, the firm's resource base
and the characteristics of its organization and management systems.
The only findings which emerge from our research which are consistent
with other studies are, first, that very high levels of product diver-
sity are associated with relatively poor profitability and, second,
the tendency for a strong cash flow to drive diversification is con-
sistent with diversification being directed towards non-profit goals.
The most important issue arising from our research and that of
others concerns the vital role of business relatedness in influencing
the success of diversification. The central problem is managing
diversification is how to exploit the benefits of relatedness through
economies of scope and transferable distinctive competences while
minimizing the organizational and managerial costs of coordination.
We argue that the balance between the costs and benefits of diversity
differs between different types of relatedness. While operational
relatedness is likely to impose managerial difficulties that outweigh
the potential economies, corporate level relatedness through strategi-
cally similar businesses are likely to offer a much more favorable
ratio of potential benefit to managerial cost.
-18-
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS: A POSTSCRIPT
In the spirit of constructive debate about research issues, we
offer the following suggestions about appropriate directions for
future research work.
12The course grained research ' presented here adds some needed
clarifications to previous research particularly with regard to work
on U.K. rather than U.S. -based data bases. This research, like many
U.S. -based studies shows that performance is more strongly influenced
by such factors as industries, markets and size than by the diversi-
fication strategy chosen. However, there are certain interesting
issues raised by the current research which merit increased attention:
(i) While diversification is preferable to specialization, the
research suggests that beyond a certain diversification
level there are limits to managing diversity, i.e., the
costs of managing a complex, diversified firm overwhelm the
benefits of diversification,
(ii) While related diversification is superior to unrelated
diversification, there are concerns both about the measure-
ment of relatedness and how to realize the benefits of
relatedness and synergy in practice,
(iii) In the U.K., context multi-national diversification is
better than product diversification. Indeed, multi-
national related diversification is far superior to
domestic unrelated diversification.
-19-
(iv) Profitability tends to drive diversification implying that
diversification is supply-led as firms seek profitable
opportunities for retained earnings.
The principal problem in drawing concrete conclusions from such
coarse-grained analyses is that the total impact of diversification
upon performance depends upon the interactions between diversification
and industry membership, firm resources, organization and managerial
capabilities. Consequently, in the paragraphs which follow, we argue
that future research should focus primarily on implementation issues,
theory building and the concept of relatedness.
Therefore, giver; the finding (i) above that diversification is
affected by the ability to manage complexity, it is necessary to take
account of implementation effects in diversification strategy. That
is, for example, within any given diversification category (related,
unrelated, etc.), the effect of diversification strategy on perfor-
mance could be influenced by reward systems designed to make business-
unit managers in diversified firms act like their counterparts in more
specialized firms. Similarly, within any given diversification stra-
tegy corporate managers may be motivated to either maximize share-
holder wealth, satisfy growth objectives or reduce risk at the expense
of shareholder concerns. Because coarse-grained studies do not
control for the influence of reward and control systems or managerial
motivations the empirical results are generally unenlightening and
only "partial" analyses of the problem. Future studies should clearly
incorporate reward systems, managerial motivations, organization and
-20-
raanagerial capabilities so that their moderating influences on the
diversification-performance relationship can be properly examined and
tested.
Theoretical frameworks can also guide future research.
13Williamson's work on transaction costs provides theoretical under-
pinnings for the assessment of the total impact of diversification
strategy on performance. Williamson's analysis of the firm as a
governance structure points to the internalization of transactions
within the diversified firm as generating efficiencies through econo-
mizing on transactions costs and correcting agency problems.
Therefore, diversified firms may be more profitable than specialized
firms. Indeed, the economic theory of organization also gives grounds
for predicting that, over time, the costs of internal organization
(through, for example, improved planning, control and financial
systems) may decline relative to the costs of market organization.
However, it is also possible to argue for an alternative thesis which
is consistent with the evidence of a trade-off between managing
complexity and the level of diversity. This alternative thesis is
that markets provide flexible and efficient means of resource alloca-
tion and that substituting corporate governance for market transac-
tions increases cost and reduces efficiency. In an early paper,
Williamson analyzed how increasing firm size necessitates additional
levels of management hierarchy with consequent information distortion,
control loss and increased administrative costs. Diversification by
creating an additional level of corporate management to control and
coordinate operating costs, not only imposes increased administrative
-21-
cost but may cause inefficiencies arising from inflexibility to
environmental change, politicization of strategic decision-making, and
increasing a strain on top management as the corporate center seeks to
manage an increasing number and diversity of businesses.
A related theoretical issue concerns the concept of relatedness as
an organizational strategy construct. In view of the complexity of,
and time involved in, applying Rumelt's categorization scheme it may
be sensible to develop new tools for categorizing firms on the basis
of interrelatedness among businesses. Possible approaches include the
following:
(i) analyzing the networks of linked pairs of businesses along a
variety of strategic dimensions
(ii) the use of continuous measures of diversification drawn from
literatures in industrial organization:
(a) The Total Diversification Measure - often referred to
as the entropy measure.
(b) The Related Diversification Measure
18(c) The Unrelated Diversification Measure
(d) The Synergy Measure (which requires line of business
data) which is a distance measure across SIC codes.
However, the key issue with relatedness (assuming satisfactory
measurement) is the decision of how to exploit it in the competitive
context and measure its value. Rumelt's relatedness construct is made
up of two constructs: the specialization ratio and the related ratio.
The specialization ratio indicates resource focus (i.e., a lower vs. a
higher number of businesses) whereas the relatedness ratio shows the
-2 2-
degree to which firm revenues are dependent upon a set of related
"core" skills. However, the concept of relatedness is problematical
in practice because it classifies firms in terms of potential (not
actual) synergiesl. More importantly it does not differentiate bet-
ween firms falling in the same relatedness category but which may dif-
fer widely with respect to resource focus (number of businesses) and
the pattern of revenue dispersion. Clearly, an implication is that a
high degree of resource focus (i.e., fewer businesses) may provide
greater managerial potential for exploiting synergies. In addition,
unrelated diversification with a high resource focus may, in fact lead
to improved performance. Consequently, in exploiting relatedness the
overall conclusion is the relationship between relatedness and
resource focus may jointly influence market power which may, in turn,
lead to improved profitability. To test this hypothesis, we would
need (apart from continuous measures of relatedness previously
19
suggested) measures of resource focus and market power.
Finally, these conjectures do not exhaust future research avenues.
For example, indepth field studies of diversification strategies in
practice should provide rich inductive insights about effective imple-
mentation. This in turn, may lead to theoretical generalizations
which should stimulate more comprehensive, deductively oriented,
coarse-grained analyses. Either way, it would be worthwhile to see
multiple research methods adopted in future studies in this field.
-23-
FOOTNOTES
For a summary, see Richard E. Caves "Industrial Organization
Corporate Strategy and Structure," Journal of Economic Literature
,
March, 1980, pp. 64-92.
2
For the U.S., see K. Palepu "Diversification Strategy, Profit
Performance and the Entrophy Measure," Strategic Management Journal
,
July-September, 1985, pp. 239-255.
3
R. A. Bettis and W. K. Hall, "Diversification Strategy, Accounting
Risk and Accounting Determined Return" Academy of Management Journal
,
1982 pp. 254-264.
A
In the U.S., M. Dolan ("The Case for the New Conglomerate" Booz,
Allen and Hamilton 1985, found conglomerate firms earned a higher ROI
than any other group once industry differences in profitability had
been taken into account, while Michel and Shaked ("Does Business
Diversification Affect Performance?" Financial Management , Winter
1984, pp. 18-24) found risk-adjusted returns to shareholders were
higher for unrelated than related diversif iers.
R. Melicher and D. Rush, "The Performance of Conglomerate Firms:
Recent Risk and Return Experience," Journal of Finance , 1973, pp.
381-388; and C. Montgomery and H. Singh, "Diversification Strategy and
Systematic Risk," Strategic Management Journal
, 1984, pp. 181-191.
See, for example, M. Firth "The Profitability of Takeovers and
Mergers," Economic Journal , 1979.
See, for example, A. Michel and I. Shaked, "Multinational
Corporations versus Domestic Corporations," Journal of International
Business Studies , Fall, 1986, pp. 89-106.
See footnote 4.
9
Jay Lorsch and Stephen A. Allen, Managing Diversity and Independence
An Organizational Study of Multidivisional firms Harvard Business
School, Boston, 1973.
See, EMI and the CT Scanner (B) HBS Case Services No.
9-383-195, Cambridge, Mass. 1983.
C. K. Prahalad and R. Bettis "The Dominant Logic: A New Linkage
between Diversity and Performance," Strategic Management Journal
,
Nov. -Dec. 1986, pp. 485-502.
-24-
12
"See K. R. Harrigan, "Research Methodologies for Contingency
Approaches to Business Strategy," Academy of Management Review
, 8, 3,
1983, 398-405, Harrigan draws the distinction between coarse-grained
(often data-driven, quantitative) research and fine-grained (more con-
textual, qualitative) research and argues for hybrid mixes of both
approaches in strategy research.
13
See a) 0. E. Williamson, "Transactions Cost Economics: The
Governance of Contractual Relations," Journal of Law and Economics
,
22, 1979, 232-261. b) Williamson, 0. E. , "The Modern Corporation:
Origins, Evolution, Attributes," Journal of Economic Literature
, 19,
1981, 1537-1568.
14
See 0. E. Williamson, "Hierarchial Control and Optimal Firm
Size," Journal of Political Economy , 75, 1967, 123-138.
See M. Gary Davis, "On an Inconsistency in Rumelt's (1974)
Methodology," Working Paper, University of New Brunswick, Canada,
1987.
1 c.
See A. P. Jacquemin and C. H. Berry, "Entropy Measure of
Diversification and Corporate Growth," Journal of Industrial
Economics , 27, 1979, 359-369.
See L. Palepu, "Diversification Strategy, Profit Performance and
the Entropy Measures," Strategic Management Journal
, 6, 1985, 239-255.
18
See R. Amit and J. Livnat, Diversification and Risk-Return
Trade-Off: Accounting and Market Analyses," Working Paper, Kellogg
School, Northwestern University, July 1987.
19
See a) W. G. Shepherd, A Treatment of Market-Power , NY:
Columbia University Press, 1975. b) C. A. Montgomery, "Product-Market
Diversification and Market Power," Academy of Management Journal , 27,
1985, 789-798.
D/249
Table 1 : The Rumelt Classification of Firms According
to Their Diversification Strategy
Firms are classified to different strategy types according to their
specialization ratio (the sales of the major business activity as a
proportion of the firm's total sales) and related ratio (the propor-
tion of the firm's total sales that are in businesses that are
related.
The categories are as follows
:
(i) Single Business
A corporation with SR
_> 0.95
(ii) Dominant Business
A corporation with 0.95 > SR
_> 0.70
(a) Dominant-Vertical
A vertically integrated corporation
(b) Dominant-Constrained
A corporation, the major portion of whose (minor) diver-
sified activities is closely related to its basic (dominant)
business
(c) Dominant-Linked
A corporation, the major portion of whose (minor) diver-
sified activities is only vaguely related to its basic
(dominant) business
(d) Dominant-Unrelated
A corporation, the major portion of whose (minor) diver-
sified activities is unrelated to its basic (dominant) busi-
ness, i.e., RR <
-j (SR+1)
(iii) Related Business
A corporation with SR < 0.70 and RR
_> 0.70
(a) Related-Linked
A corporation, at least 70 percent of whose businesses are
closely related to one another through a specific core skill
common to each
Table 1 (cont'd.)
(b) Related-Linked
A corporation, the majority of whose businesses are only
vaguely relate to one another via a string of linkages be-
tween them
(c) Unrelated Business
TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION EQUATIONS
A. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RETURN AND DIVERSITY: EXAMINATION OF RELATIVE
VALUE OF PRODUCT AND MULTINATIONAL DIVERSITY
RETURN = f (Product diversity, multinational diversity, size,
leverage, industry membership)
Notes: a) Product diversity varied between regressions. One set
used Rumelt, another set used the product diver-
sification index—in both linear and quadratic form (to
reflect diminishing returns to PDI)
b) Multinational Diversity (MDI) was also included in both
linear and quadratic form.
B. DIRECTION OF CAUSATION
(i) Changes in return regressed on changes in PDI and MDI
ARETURN - f(APDI, AMDI, industry membership)
Note: ARETURN denotes change in return, etc.
(ii) Changes in diversity regressed on cash flow and other factors
APDI f (Cashflow, size, leverage, industry membership,
{or AMDl} initial levels of diversity)
Table 1: Average ROI differences between the Rumelt strategic categories
1972 - 1984
ROI relative to the single business category
Before adjusting After adjusting
for other variables for other
variables
5 3
Single business
Dominant Vertical +1,.3
Dominant Constrained +0,,3
Dominant related and -0 8
unrelated
Related Constrained +1..6
Related Linked +2 .2
Unrelated +1 .4
-0.5
-0.7
-1.0
+2.5
-0.2
+1.2
Notes "Other variables" include multinational diversity firm
size, leverage and industry effects,
None of the above category differences are significantly
different from at the 90% level of probability.
Table 4: Types of relatedness between the business units of a
diversified corporation.
TYPE OF RELATEDNESS EXAMPLES PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS
Operational
relatedness
Inputs and activities
common to several bus-
iness units
Exploits economies of scope
in joint activities but
imposes costs of coordination
on corporate management, lowers
divisional autonomy and flexib-
ility.
Transfer of
core skills
Transfer from one bus-
iness unit to another of
R&D capabilities, market
-ing skills, manufactur-
ing expertise etc.
Permits transfer of compet-
itive advantage between bus-
inesses at low additional cost
but also requires some corp-
orate level coordination which
may conflict with the benefits
from decentralization.
Corporate The appl ication of
common systems of res-
ource allocation, per-
formance monitoring,
& strategy formulation
to different business
units.
Permits increased effective-
ness in the conduct of corporate
level managment processes, while
maintaining business units as
autonomous profit centers.
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